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THE POWER OF PRIVATE FACTS
Anita L. Allen*

IF AN ENGAGING style could serve as a palliative, Frederick
Schauer's Reflections on the Value of Truth would have caused
his symposium commentators no trouble.1 But, Erwin Chemerinsky and Susan Gilles contend that Professor Schauer's substantive
' 2
arguments, however engaging, are "misguided," "dangerous," "of
little help," and "elitist." 3 My reaction to Professor Schauer's assessment of first amendment values and the competing privacy
values recognized by tort law is different from the other commentators' reactions. I am substantially in accord with Schauer's main
points and will try to explain why below.
Professor Schauer begins by arguing against a conception of
the value of truth held by some first amendment theorists.' According to Professor Schauer, the value of truth is not inherent
and categorical; it is contingent and instrumental.5 A community
is not always better off knowing everything that might conceivably
be known about each of its members.' Professor Schauer concludes that not even the media best serve the community by publishing facts about individuals simply because they are facts. He
suggests that courts are sometimes justified in holding defendants
liable in tort for injuries stemming from the publication of private
facts;7 tort compensation for invasion of privacy is justified where
the disclosure of private facts is "highly offensive," at least in
part, because of the particular allocation of power immunized disclosure would represent.
Where do Professor Schauer's reflections leave venerated lib-

Professor of Law, Georgetown Law Center.
1. Schauer, Reflections on the Value of Truth, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 699 (1991).
2. Chemerinsky, In Defense of Truth, 41 CASE W. Rs. L. REv. 745, 745 (1991).
3. Gilles, All Truths Are Equal, But Some Truths are More Equal Than Others, 41
CASE W. RES. L. REv. 725, 729 (1991).
4. Schauer, supra note I, at 699-704.
5. Id. at 704-07.
6. Id. at 708.
7. Id. at 717.
*
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eral ideals of truth and truth-telling? They are largely left alone.
Viewing his overall argument schematically, it is apparent that
Professor Schauer's analysis does not denigrate truth. He argues
as follows:
(1) Truth has instrumental, not intrinsic, value.8
(2) Truth's instrumental value is contingent rather than
necessary. 9
(3) Acquiring truth usually has better consequences than acquiring falsehood. 10
(4) Gains in knowledge-justified true belief-do not always
lead to aggregate utility, happiness, or welfare.'
(5) Gains in knowledge may "come at the expense of someone
else's well-being or dignity."' 2
(6) Since gains in knowledge may come at someone's expense,
knowledge may be used as an instrument of power.1 3
(7) Those who know what is true or probably true about a person have a degree of power over that person.14
(8) The design of legal rules regulating the dissemination of
knowledge should include consideration of who will have that
knowledge, at whose expense that knowledge will be gained, and
what, if any, are the societal benefits or costs of that shift in
power.' 5
(9) Privacy law regulates the dissemination of knowledge. In
rendering decisions in tort cases alleging wrongful publication of
private facts, courts should consider the class of individuals or
6
institutions likely to be empowered by victory or defeat.'
(10) Media defendants in privacy actions alleging wrongful publication of private facts should not prevail simply7 because they
are the media and have published what is true.
The first two premises are logically consistent with the proposition that truth is as valuable as the most valuable human
good. These assertions, therefore, do not entail a denigrated view
of truth.' The next five premises are essentially empirical claims

8. Id. at 706.
9. Id. at 709.
10. Id. at 707.

11. Id. at 707-08.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id. at 710-11.
Id. at 713-14.
Id. at 714.
Id. at 717.
Id. at 722-24.
Id. at 724.
Schauer's opening premises comprise a serious philosophical position, seriously
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borne out by ordinary experience. Concrete cases offer significant
'support. 9 The last three premises do not follow inexorably as a
matter of logic alone from the first seven. They are normative rec•ommendations about the appropriate legal response to premises
one through seven. Professor Schauer openly admits that the crucial assertions contained in the last three premises would be rejected by those who are antipathetic to either conjunct of his belief that "power relations among people and institutions are
necessarily implicated in the design of legal doctrine.

. .

and thus

ought to be considered explicitly in the design of doctrine
"20

The schematic presentation of his argument plainly reveals
that Professor Schauer rejects categorical equations of "the true"
with "the good."2 Yet, this presentation reveals that Professor
Schauer does not reject truth or its free expression. Moreover,
Professor Schauer does not send us sliding down a slippery slope
toward low esteem for knowledge. He does not argue that we
should habitually lie to one another to achieve private or public
gain, nor does he recommend a regime of government secrecy.
Professor Schauer does assert that the public might be better off if
it occasionally believed a falsehood. However, unlike Socrates in
Plato's Republic, Professor Schauer does not propose that public
officials disseminate convenient falsehoods to gain citizen cooperation.22 Professor Schauer does not urge that government adopt
"Big Brother" surveillance policies to constrain debate and limit
access to information. He does not propose that courts drastically
or intemperately broaden their role in the social definition of permissible knowledge. Professors Chemerinsky and Gilles exaggerate the adverse implications of Schauer's stand.
Professor Schauer's emphasis on knowledge and power relations brings a refreshing realism to the discussion of privacy law.
Judicial ascription of privacy rights is an allocation of power.

defended. However, I am not certain what, in principle, a conclusive defense of premises
one and two would look like.
19. See infra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
20. Schauer, supra note I, at 718.
21. Compare PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 220 (F. Conford trans. 1941) ("Both knowledge
and truth are to be regarded as like the Good, but to identify either with the Good is wrong
The Good must hold a yet higher place of honour.").
22. Id. at 106-07 (Socrates explains that rulers must propagate the fable that citizen's are by nature golden, silver, or bronze-and that only golden citizens may rule-for
the good of the public).
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Those who have license to say what they please about others without fear of criminal penalty or civil liability enjoy a brand of
power. It is appropriate that, when faced with the task of adjudicating privacy tort claims, courts consider the impact the rules
they fashion will have on the relative allocation of power among
affected parties.
Professor Schauer argues that "we should examine privacy
law by looking at the class of individuals or institutions empowered by an increase in information brought by a relaxation of the
current standard and at whose expense ....-23 Where the societal and personal costs of telling what one knows are sufficiently
high and sufficiently discernable in advance, legal immunity is
problematic. The first amendment does not require blanket immunity for the media. Professor Schauer correctly concludes that the
media should not always win: the mere fact that the media is the
media and has published the truth should not automatically bar
actions for invasion of privacy premised on the publication of private facts. The reason that the media and other defendants should
not have legal immunity is that immunity gives them more relative power than the Constitution requires or fairness permits.
Harrisby Harrisv. Easton PublishingCo.,2 4 a case involving
the "private fact" tort, illustrates that revealing private facts can
be a harmful exercise of power. Harris, like many other uncelebrated lower court cases, reflects the reality of power as a
source of, and remedy for, some categories of privacy-related injuries.2" In Harris, a Pennsylvania newspaper published by Easton
Publishing Company ("Easton") ran a question-and-answer column about eligibility for public welfare benefits. The paper featured questions received and answered by the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare ("the Department").2 6 After Brigitte
Harris, the immigrant wife of an American serviceman, contacted
the Department with questions, it forwarded a slightly altered version of Harris's questions bearing the initials "J.S." and a fiction2
alized hometown to selected print media. 1

23. Schauer, supra note 1,at 718; see A. ALLEN, UNEASY AccEss: PRIVACY FOR
Mack, How Privacy Got Its Gender, 10 N.

WOMEN IN A FREE SOCIETY (1988); Allen &
ILL. L. REV. 441 (1990).

24.
25.
457-65.
26.
27.

335 Pa. Super. 141, 483 A.2d 1377 (1984).
See, e.g., A. ALLEN, supra note 23, at 123-52; Allen & Mack, supra note 23, at
Harris, 335 Pa. Super. at 149, 483 A.2d at 1381.
Id. at 149-51, 483 A.2d at 1381-82.
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In the Department's version, J.S. related that she recently
sought food stamps for herself, her pregnant teenaged daughter,
and her grandson. Harris also applied for food stamps for herself,
her pregnant teenaged daughter, and her grandchild. J.S. inquired
about medical care for her pregnant daughter. Harris had made
the same inquiry. J.S. said that the welfare office refused to process her application because she would not allow them to photocopy her naturalization papers, which 'she believed could not be
copied lawfully. Harris had withdrawn her application because a
caseworker insisted on duplicating documents bearing a written
prohibition against photocopying. J.S. asked whether her eligibility for food stamps would be affected by the income of a son who
lived 4t home and worked intermittently. Harris had raised the
same concern about her son. Easton chose to publish the questions
posed by J.S. without the initials and hometown provided by the
Department and without the Department's disclaimer that the
facts were fictionalized. 8
Harris brought a lawsuit alleging invasion of privacy against
Easton, the Department, the Northampton County Board of Public Assistance, and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Harris
maintained that seventeen people recognized her in the published
account. Harris's complaint against all public defendants was dismissed with prejudice on the ground of governmental immunity. A
trial court subsequently granted Easton's motion for summary
judgment and Harris immediately appealed.2 9
The appellate court addressed the question of whether Harris
established a prima facie claim for invasion of privacy. The court
noted that Pennsylvania had adopted the Restatement definition
of the tort of invasion of privacy.30 Harris alleged that the publication of her inquiries invaded her privacy in two respects: the
unauthorized publication constituted an unreasonable "intrusion
upon seclusion"31 and unreasonable "publicity given to private
life."' 32 The absence of physical intrusion into a place where the

28. Id. at 151, 483 A.2d at 1382.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 153, 483 A.2d at 1383. According to the Restatement "One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the
intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 652B (1976), quoted in Harris, 335 Pa. Super. at 153, 483 A.2d at 1383.
32. Harris, 335 Pa. Super. at 152, 483 A.2d at 1383. The Restatement states that:
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plaintiff had secluded herself or personal information led the court
to conclude that the first type of privacy invasion had not occurred
and thus to uphold that portion of the trial court's summary
judgment. ,
On the second claim, the court held that Harris's allegations
presented material questions of fact as to whether unreasonable
publicity was given to her circumstances."3 The court found sufficient evidence of publicity, even though it believed a stricter standard applied in "private fact" privacy cases than in defamation
cases. 4 The court stated that the privacy tort requires publication
not simply to a single person or newspaper but "to the public at
large, or to so many persons that the matter must be regarded as
35
substantially certain to become one of public knowledge.
Stressing that at least seventeen persons identified the plaintiff
from the publication, the court also found that the publication
could be deemed to concern the plaintiff even though it did not
expressly name or picture her.3
The court considered, but rejected, the trial court's conclusion that the "private facts" in the welfare column were not private by the time they reached Easton because the Department had
made them public by releasing them to the press. However, the
court noted that ultimate liability in the case would depend upon
whether the seventeen people who recognized the plaintiff learned
anything about her they had not already known. The seventeen
may have learned for the first time that Harris was poor enough
to be eligible for welfare, that her teenaged daughter was pregnant, and that her son's employment was irregular. This publication may have embarrassed Harris and damaged her reputation.
To buttress the contention that Easton's publication was unreasonably offensive, the court relied on provisions of the Public

One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another is
subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the matter published is of a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and
(b) is not of legitimate concern to the public.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1976); Harris, 335 Pa. Super. at 154, 483
A.2d at 1384.
33. The court understood the central elements of the "private fact" tort to be: "(I)
publicity, given to (2) private facts, (3) which would be highly offensive to a reasonable
person and (4) is not of legitimate concern to the public." Harris, 335 Pa. Super. at 154,
483 A.2d at 1384 (citation omitted).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 155, 483 A.2d at 1384.
36. Id. at 158, 483 A.2d at 1386.
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Welfare Code prescribing protection of information obtained in
the course of applications for 'public assistance.37 Thus, while welfare recipients "do not have an absolute right to keep private"3 8
all facts about their status, "applicants have a legitimate basis for
believing that the personal or confidential information revealed to
the Department as part of their applications for assistance will not
subsequently appear in their local newspaper for all to read." 39
The court understood that the Public Welfare Code did not attempt to define a duty of secrecy for third parties (like Easton).
The court relied on the Code solely to confirm Harris's contention
that certain disclosures of welfare information are unreasonable
and offensive.
The final element of the "private fact" privacy tort embodies
the common law newsworthiness privilege other courts have recognized.40 The private facts publicized by Easton were arguably of
public concern. Other members of the low income community
might have pregnant daughters, legal documents they fear copying, and adult children living at home. The court cited the doubtless "benefits inherent in the publication of information to aid
those eligible for public assistance who encounter difficulties in applying for assistance or continuing" assistance.4 1 The court nonetheless concluded that "there is no legitimate public concern in
giving publicity to the actual circumstances of a person's application. . . in. . .a way as to imply that those facts are true," and
the facts about Harris "were unnecessary to aid those interested
'42
in receiving advice.
The Harris case illustrates the relation between privacy and
power. Poor women with children are among the most powerless
groups in our society. State government and media concerns are
among the most powerful. As a condition of obtaining public as-

37. Id. at 158-59, 483 A.2d at 1386.
38. Id. at 159, 483 A.2d at 1386 (emphasis in original).
39. Id.
40. See, e.g., Cape Publications Inc. v. Bridges, 423 So. 2d 426 (1982), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 893 (1983) (no invasion of privacy where photograph of nude crime victim is
newsworthy).
41. Harris, 335 Pa. Super. at 160, 483 A.2d at 1387 (emphasis in original).
42. Id. An analogous, and equally meritorious argument, has been made about the
publication of the identities of rape victims, an issue inconclusively addressed by the Supreme Court of the United States in Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989), and Cox
Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975). Although the community should be
made aware of the incidence and location of violent crime, it is rarely necessary to reveal
the identity of the victim.
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sistance for her family, government authorities required Harris to
disclose intimate facts about her circumstances. Once she made
the required disclosures, her story was used without her express
consent for the benefit of others. Admittedly, entitlement to benefits is a kind of private power over public officials. A woman can
"compel" benefits simply by qualifying. As a practical matter,
however, bureaucrats, not individuals, control access to public assistance programs.
In appropriate cases, media tort liability can empower the
powerless through mechanisms of compensation, punishment, and
deterrence. In cases like Harris, for example, a compensatory
damage award would enable plaintiffs to finance the material consequences of unwanted publicity. A damage award would also penalize media defendants for recklessly disregarding the privacy interests of welfare recipients. From a public policy perspective,
imposing liability would deter the media from inflicting future injury under the guise of providing a "public service." Newspapers
might attempt to avoid liability by publishing such information
only when effective disclaimers and assurances of privacy protection or consent have been given by the public assistance agency.
Increasing the costs of running a newspaper business to prohibitive levels through the threat of liability is not in anyone's interest.
However, encouraging the media and welfare officials to cooperate
in publishing public service information without needlessly imposing reputational and emotional burdens on vulnerable segments of
the community is very much in the interests of citizens like Brigitte Harris.
The trial court in Harrishad attempted to frame the case as
one about "the right of the press to publish information which it
has already acquired without solicitation." 4 3 The appeals court
reasoned that there is no "unsolicited materials" exception to the
invasion of privacy tort. The court also rejected Easton's claim
that the case was controlled by Time, Inc. v. Hill.4 4 There the
Court observed that the plaintiff, a former kidnap victim, was already a public figure at the time of the allegedly tortious publication. Harris was not. Also, the Time v. Hill plaintiff had alleged
injury due to falsehood in a fictionalization of truth. Harris
claimed injury due to truth in a fictionalization of truth. The court
recognized that important constitutional issues raised by Harris

43.
44.

335 Pa. Super. at 161, 483 A.2d at 1387.
385 U.S. 374 (1967).
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were not resolved by the Supreme Court in Time v. Hill or its
other privacy-related first amendment cases.
Responding to the constitutional questions ultimately raised
by the case, the Harris court stated that:
The right of privacy competes with the freedom of the
press as well as the interest of the public in the free dissemination of news and information, and these permanent
public interests must be considered when placing the necessary limitations upon the right of privacy. .

. An ac-

tion based on [the right to privacy] must not become a
vehicle for establishment of a judicial censorship of the
press.. . . However, on balancing the various interests, we

hold that [Easton] was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.45
A "balancing of interest" properly includes the interest of
poor mothers in empowerment vis-a-vis the more powerful institutions of state and press. The Pennsylvania Public Welfare Code
stands as evidence of the popular will and expectation that poor
women be so empowered. Where, as here, express statutory privacy provisions do not reach media conduct, the court's common
law decision to reverse summary judgment is an effective check on
gratuitous inflictions of emotional pain by the press. In reversing
summary judgment, the appellate court protected the interests of
a vulnerable community in a way that left first amendment guarantees of free press intact.
I would add that Professor Schauer's assertion that the
ascription of privacy rights is the allocation of power is correct
whether one is speaking of privacy rights under federal or state
constitutions,4 the common law,47 or statutes.48 It is correct
45. Harris, 335 Pa. Super. at 162, 483 A.2d at 1388 (citations omitted).
46. E.g., US. CONST. amend. IV. The relationship between power and privacy is
readily seen in the case of government intrusion of the sort the fourth amendment was
adopted to deter. When James Otis complained about British officials' "unreasonable"
searches of the American colonists' business papers, he was complaining about abuses of
power. See Paxton's Case, Quincy's Reports 51 (Mass. 1761).
47. See, e.g., Phillips v. Smalley Maintenance, 435 So. 2d 705 (Ala. 1983) (sexual
harrassment in employment); Bodewig v. K-Mart, 54 Or. App. 480, 635 P.2d 657 (1981)
(employer strip search of employee in front of third party); Bennett v. Norban, 396 Pa. 94,
151 A.2d 476 (1959) (retailer's stop and search of customer in parking lot); Harris by
Harris v. Easton Publishing Co., 335 Pa. Super. 141, 483 A.2d 1377 (1984) (newspaper's
publication of private facts). Invasions of privacy have also been alleged by the more powerful party in a relationship. See, e.g., Barr v. Arco Chem. Corp., 529 F. Supp. 1277 (S.D.
Tex. 1982) (tape recording of alleged discriminatory termination by employee); N.O.C.,
Inc. v. Schaefer, 197 N.J. Super. 249, 484 A.2d 729 (1984) (observation of illegal business
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whether the "privacy" in question is freedom from interference
with autonomous decision making or freedom from highly offensive intrusion, disclosure of confidences, publication, or commercial appropriation. One who can invade or violate another's privacy is a powerholder. Knowing interference with another's
privacy is an exercise of power.
The law of privacy has no unique relationship to power. Even
within tort law, privacy claims are not unique in providing courts
with occasions for thinking hard about how legal rules influence
the allocation of power. The ascription of rights against battery,
assault, intentional infliction of emotional distress, false imprisonment, and defamation are also allocations of power. If parents
were immune from liability for beating their children or corporations for retaining managers who sexually harass secretaries, the
law would allocate powers of exploitation to families and firms.
Knowing this, courts weighing their decisions properly consider
power relations. Courts in worker harassment cases often expressly consider the relative power of worker, supervisor, and employer. The court easily appreciated that the plaintiff who sued for
infliction of emotional distress in Ford v. Revlon49 was a victim of
raw power. Inside and outside of privacy law, the allocation and
reallocation of power is an important aspect of what courts do
when they decide cases. Sometimes they do it, and should do it,
explicitly.
CONCLUSION

Knowledge is power, Professor Schauer reminds us. Our society potentially keeps powerful knowledge away from potential
knowers by ascribing legal privacy rights. If gains in knowledge
were inherently good, all efforts to decrease knowledge would be
facially invalid, even those designed to protect the privacy of the
most vulnerable segments of society. Professor Schauer underscores that some gains in knowledge are not worth the price. I
concur in his unwillingness to subscribe to an interpretation of the
activity by private citizen).
48. E.g., Rios v. Read, 73 F.R.D. 589 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (construing federal statute
to allow community group access to academic records over objections of school officials and
individual students); Humphers v. First Interstate Bank, 298 Or. 706, 696 P.2d 527 (1985)
(physician's disclosure of natural mother's identity in violation of confidentiality statute).
49. 153 Ariz. 38, 734 P.2d 580 (1987) (female plaintiff sued for infliction of emotional distress after male department head fondled her and repeatedly announced "I am
going to fuck you").
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first amendment that presumes gains in knowledge are always positive contributions to the aggregate good. It is always important to
consider how truth arrives at the "marketplace of ideas," who will
purchase it, and, after the purchase, how many lives will be nourished by the knowledge it represents and to what extent of
fulfillment.

